Russia has had military influence in Asia for decades. Why is it a surprise it wants more?

The biggest surprise about the news that Russia may have been trying to base aircraft in Indonesia was that it was a surprise at all. Russia has long been trying to position itself as influential in South-East Asia alongside China and the US, and has deep ties in South Asia with one of Australia’s key regional allies, India, along with Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.

“The prospect of having Russia with a greater presence in our region is very real and there are a lot of questions the government still has to answer,” Peter Dutton said as he tried to justify verballing Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto.

But despite the desperate LNP claims that the Albanese government had been “blindsided”, Australian diplomats would be acutely aware of Russia’s already deep, decades-long relationships, as well as ambitions, in South-East and South Asia. If Dutton is aware of this, he’s stoking public unrest to paint his election opponent as incompetent. If he isn’t, then he is beyond clueless, with Russia having long-standing alliances and military, trade and energy interests in the region.

For years, Moscow has sought to position itself as a “third force” in Asia, counterbalancing US and Chinese influence through arms sales, energy partnerships and diplomatic engagement across the 10-nation ASEAN bloc. ASEAN states are sensitive to so-called great power competition, and are reluctant (with expectations such as China-captured Cambodia) to be seen as aligning too closely with any one major power. But as US aid and engagement recede, Russia — alongside China — is poised to exploit the resulting vacuum.

Indonesia swiftly denied reports that Russia had requested permission to base military aircraft in its Papua province. But Russia has nonetheless made ongoing efforts to deepen military ties with Australia’s neighbour in recent years. Then president-elect Prabowo Subianto flew to Moscow last July to meet Vladimir Putin; Russia backed Indonesia’s BRICS membership in January; and the two nations conducted their first-ever joint naval exercises in November 2024. Plus, Prabowo plans to visit Putin again in Moscow in June.

Russia is also the largest arms supplier to South-East Asia, cornering 25% of the region’s market for weapons, valued at more than US$42 billion between 2004 to 2023. Russian officials claimed that as of late 2024, South-East Asia accounted for around 50% of Russia’s total arms export portfolio. Vietnam buys about 80% of its arms from Russia. India is Russia’s single-biggest weapons customer, accounting for about 38% of Russia’s arms sales — though you won’t hear Dutton bleating about that.

Sanctions, supply issues and the impact of the Ukraine war have made this market more difficult for Russia. The US Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) has deterred some ASEAN nations from new Russian deals. High costs and logistical challenges have led countries like Malaysia to question the value of Russian equipment, with only a fraction of its Su-30 jet fleet operational at any time. Despite these obstacles, Russia remains a key supplier for countries with limited alternatives — most notably Myanmar, where the military junta relies on Moscow for advanced weaponry.

Beyond arms, Russia’s trade with ASEAN nations reached a record US$22 billion in 2023, up 14.6% from the previous year, with further growth in 2024. Russia exports fertilisers, metals and engineering products, while importing electronics and industrial goods from ASEAN. Yet unlike the US and China, Russian investment in the region remains minimal — just US$159 million compared to US$40 billion from the US.

Russian energy giants have sought partnerships in oil, gas and nuclear sectors, but Western sanctions and logistical challenges have limited these ventures. Notable examples include joint oil and gas projects in the South China Sea as well as nuclear energy cooperation and renewable energy projects with Vietnam, the ASEAN nation that Russia has ties with stretching back to the Vietnam War. Russia and Indonesia this week announced energy cooperation in nuclear, fossil fuels and renewables, and Moscow is also exploring similar themes with Malaysia.

On a multilateral basis, Russia participates in ASEAN-led forums, including the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus. Later this year, Russia and ASEAN plan to sign a new five-year Strategic Program for Trade and Investment Cooperation.

The near-total freeze of USAID under the Trump administration in early 2025 has severely disrupted development programs across South-East Asia. With 83% of US aid programs cut, countries like Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Indonesia and the Philippines have lost critical support in health, education and civil society sectors. The vacuum left by the US is being filled primarily by China, but also presents opportunities for Russia to expand its influence.

But it is with India, Australia’s newest ally in the Quad Alliance (with the US and Japan), that Russia has the deepest ties. Bilateral trade between Russia and India reached a record US$65 billion in 2023, making Russia India’s fourth-largest trading partner. Key areas of cooperation include long-term contracts for Russian oil and gas supplies, collaboration on nuclear power projects, fertilisers, coal and critical sectors like agriculture. In April 2025, the two countries agreed on six new strategic projects to deepen investment ties, focusing on trade, technological innovation and economic development.

Likewise, military cooperation between Russia and Sri Lanka dates back to the 1960s, with the Soviet Union providing critical support during Sri Lanka’s internal conflicts. The relationship has evolved to include annual defence cooperation action plans, joint training, and high-level military exchanges. Russia is also positioning itself as a key partner in Sri Lanka’s energy sector. Similarly, Russia supplies arms, nuclear technology and is eyeing gas deposits in Bangladesh.

Russia continues to pursue deeper military, economic, and diplomatic ties with ASEAN states as they seek alternatives to US and Chinese influence. The next few years will determine whether Moscow can adapt to new realities and maintain its relevance in a region where great power competition is only intensifying. 

It’s time our leaders started being upfront with the Australian people about South-East Asia being a key focus for the world’s major military powers. They need to start dealing with realpolitik instead of fanciful political scare campaigns.

Are you concerned by a growing Russian presence in Australia’s backyard?

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